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ABSTRACT 
The technologic capabilities of autonomous systems (AS) continue to accelerate, 
and integrated performance by AS and people working together can be superior to that of 
either AS or people working alone. We refer to this increasingly important phenomenon 
as Teams of Autonomous Systems and People (TASP), and through our recent 
research—representing the current state of the art—we have demonstrated computational 
experimentation capability in the TASP domain. The problem is, several technology 
trends suggest that unmanned aircraft may be diverging away from operating and 
behaving like their manned counterparts, suggesting that some of our most futuristic 
model assumptions may be off target. This is where our ongoing research project begins 
to make an important contribution by investigating the next generation of autonomous 
systems. In this technical report, we motivate and introduce such TASP research, and we 
provide an overview of the computational environment used to experiment on TASP 
command and control organizations and phenomena. We summarize in turn the research 
method. Key results follow, and we conclude then by summarizing our agenda for 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 
The US Department of Defense (DoD), along with the militaries of NATO 
members and other allied nations, has discovered and begun to capitalize upon the value 
of robots, unmanned vehicles and other autonomous systems (AS) for a variety of 
different missions, ranging from search and rescue, through aerial bombing, to 
Cyberspace surveillance. To a large extent, people in such military organizations operate 
and control the AS, much the same way that people in many factories operate and control 
machines for production, assembly and packaging. The AS are basically slaves to their 
human operators. 
The technologic capabilities of AS continue to accelerate, however, and systems 
in some domains have reached the technical point of total autonomy: they can perform 
entire missions without human intervention or control. For instance, in 2001 a Global 
Hawk flew autonomously on a non-stop mission from California to Australia, making 
history by being the first pilotless aircraft to cross the Pacific Ocean (AMoD, 2001). As 
another instance, in 2013 a Northrop Grumman X-47B unmanned combat air vehicle 
successfully took off from and landed on an aircraft carrier underway at sea (BBC, 2013). 
This elucidates many emerging issues in terms of command and control (C2). 
Who, for instance, commands and controls unmanned aircraft when they fly 
autonomously? Clearly there are operators who monitor such vehicles, and there are 
commanders who authorize their missions, but the mission itself is conducted 
autonomously, and it remains somewhat unclear whom to hold accountable (e.g., the 
commander, the operator, the engineer, the manufacturer) if something goes wrong or 
whom to credit if all goes well. 
Further, as technologic sophistication continues to advance rapidly (e.g., in 
computational processing, collective sense making, intelligent decision making), a wide 
array of diverse robots (e.g., in hospitals; see Feil-Seifer & Mataric, 2005), unmanned 
vehicles (e.g., for highway driving; see Muller, 2012) and other intelligent systems (e.g., 
for industrial control; see McFarlane et al., 2003) continue to demonstrate unprecedented 
capabilities for extended, independent and even collective decision making and action 
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(e.g., offensive and defensive swarming; see Bamberger et al., 2006). Indeed, the 
technologic maturity of many AS available today (e.g., UCLASS – Unmanned Carrier-
Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike; see Dolgin et al., 1999) exceed the authority 
delegated to them by organizations and leaders; that is, their performance is limited more 
by policy than technology (e.g., see DoDD 3000.09, 2012). 
In many skilled mission domains and under demanding environmental conditions 
(e.g., tactical surveillance; see Joyce, 2013), AS are replacing people at an increasing rate 
(e.g., unmanned vs. manned aircraft sorties; see Couts, 2012). These machines can 
outperform their human counterparts in many dimensions (e.g., consistency, memory, 
processing power, endurance; see Condon et al., 2013), yet they fall short in other ways 
(e.g., adaptability, innovation, judgment under uncertainty; see HRW, 2012). Task 
performance by AS is optimal in some situations, and performance by people is best in 
others, but in either case, the respective capabilities of autonomous machines and people 
remain complementary. As such, integrated performance, by complementary autonomous 
systems and people working together, can be superior in an increasing number of 
circumstances, including those requiring skillful collective action (Nissen & Place, 2013). 
Hence there is more to this trend than simple technologic automation of skilled 
work by machines (e.g., numerical control machining) or employment of computer tools 
by skilled people (e.g., computer aided drafting). Where autonomous systems and people 
collaborate together in coherent teams and organizations, we refer to this increasingly 
important phenomenon as Teams of Autonomous Systems and People (TASP). 
 
B. OPEN C2 QUESTIONS 
TASP raises a plethora of open, C2 research, policy and decision making 
questions. For one, under what circumstances should people work subordinate to AS 
(e.g., robot supervisor) versus controlling them (e.g., robot subordinate)? Few 
researchers, policy makers or organization leaders are even asking this question today, 
much less trying to answer it, as the conventional, conservative and often naïve bias is 
overwhelmingly toward people controlling machines. Nonetheless, empirical evidence 
shows that AS can produce superior results—in some circumstances—when people are 
subordinate (e.g., see Bourne, 2013). This represents revolutionary change, and our 
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millennia of accumulated knowledge in terms of C2, organization, management, 
leadership, information science, computer science, human-systems integration and like 
domains leaves us largely unprepared to seize upon such situated performance 
superiority. 
For another, under what circumstances should units comprised of people be 
organized, led and managed separately from counterparts comprised of AS (e.g., separate 
aircraft squadrons), and what circumstances favor instead organization integration1 of 
people and AS into combined units (e.g., integrated or composite squadrons; see CFFC, 
2014)? Because every mission-environment context manifests some uniqueness, the 
answer may vary across diverse missions, environments, times and organizations; even 
individual personnel skills, team trust levels, leadership characteristics, political risk 
aversion, and like factors may affect the approach leading to greatest mission efficacy. 
Indeed, a central aspect of mission planning and execution may require explicit 
consideration of how people and AS should be organized, and such TASP organization 
may even require dynamic replanning and change mid-mission. 
For a third, how can researchers, policy makers and leaders develop confidence 
that their chosen C2 organization approach (e.g., to subordinating or superordinating 
robots to people, to separating or integrating AS and personnel units, to selecting 
missions involving collaboration between people and AS) will be superior? These 
technology-induced research questions are so new and foreign that negligible theory is 
available for guidance, and it is prohibitively time-consuming, expensive and error-prone 
to systematically test the myriad different approaches via operational organizations. This 
is the case in particular where loss of life, limb or liberty may be at stake. 
 
C. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTATION 
Computational experimentation offers an unmatched yet largely unexplored 
potential to address C2 questions along these lines. If computational models can be 
                                                 
1 For instance, HSM-35, located at NAS North Island, has been organized and configured to manage and 
support both the Fire Scout UAS and the H-60 aircraft (e.g., integrated technicians and operators have been 
trained to maintain and operate both systems). Additional information and guidance is available in the 
USFF/CNAF UAS Concept of Operations. Nonetheless, several questions remain: Is such integration a 
good idea? On what science is it based? What are the comparative advantages and disadvantages? How 
could it become even more effective? 
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developed to represent the most important aspects of organizations with existing, planned 
or possible TASP benefits, then researchers could employ such models to address the 
kinds of open questions posed above. Moreover, organization leaders, managers and 
policy makers could develop confidence in their situated decisions and actions involving 
the organization, integration and leadership of AS and people. 
Further, once such computational models have been developed and validated, they 
can become virtual prototype C2 organizations to be examined empirically and under 
controlled conditions through efficient computational experiments (e.g., see Oh et al., 
2009). Indeed, tens, hundreds, even thousands of diverse approaches to TASP C2 can be 
examined very quickly, with their relative behavior and performance characteristics 
compared to match the best C2 approach with a variety of different missions, 
environmental conditions, technologic capabilities, autonomy policies, personnel 
characteristics, skill levels and job types. Moreover, such computational experimentation 
and comparison can be accomplished very quickly and at extremely low cost relative to 
that required to experiment with teams or organizations in the laboratory—or especially 
in the field—with no risk of losing life, equipment or territory in the process (e.g., see 
Nissen & Buettner, 2004). 
Toward this end, recent research (Nissen & Place, 2014)—representing the current 
state of the art (i.e., VDT; see Levitt et al., 1999)—has employed computational 
modeling and simulation technology to demonstrate computational experimentation 
capability in the TASP domain. Specifically, an agent-based model, which captures and 
reflects the structure, behavior and performance characteristics of C2 organizations in the 
field, is used to examine alternate C2 approaches and AS capabilities—both as available 
today and projected for the future—in the context of exploring TASP opportunities, 
alternatives and decision spaces.  
Computational models assess six distinct degrees of AS capability—ranging from 
Degree 0 – no autonomy (i.e., manned aircraft) to Degree 5 – future capability (e.g., AS 
matching manned capabilities)—corresponding to both current and potential ship and 
aircraft platforms (i.e., CVN, DDG, LCS, F/A-18, MH-60, Scan Eagle, Fire Scout, 
Triton, future AS). Models also assess four distinct levels of mission interdependence—
ranging from Pooled (e.g., manned or unmanned missions in separate airspaces) to 
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Integrated (e.g., manned and unmanned missions in common airspaces)—as an 
orthogonal dimension. For instance, consider the nature of a mission—and its 
corresponding C2 requirements and complications—with an unmanned wingman flying 
alongside a manned aircraft leader, or symmetrically, consider a manned pilot flying as 
wingman alongside his or her unmanned aircraft leader.  
Together these six degrees of autonomy and four levels of interdependence produce a 
24 cell matrix of TASP contexts that are assessed in terms of C2 organization 
performance for a 24-hour ISR mission. Each cell is represented by a separate 
computational model, which is simulated 50 times, across eight performance dimensions, 
to create a substantial analytic space. 
However, such recent research has assumed that next generation unmanned 
aircraft will operate and behave increasingly like manned aircraft. The problem is, several 
technology trends suggest that unmanned aircraft may be diverging instead of 
converging, developing their own, unique modes of operation and sets of behaviors. 
Indeed, some such modes and sets may make integration of manned and unmanned 
aircraft more challenging, not less. This has enormous C2 implications, and our recently 
developed computational modeling and simulation capability hinges on the results of the 
current research project. 
 
D. RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
This is where our ongoing research project continues to make an important 
contribution. The project described in this technical report centers on expanding our 
recently enabled C2 computational modeling and simulation capability to understand next 
generation unmanned aircraft systems, with particular emphasis on specifying advanced 
models for computational experimentation. In particular, we investigate technology 
trajectories and design visions for next generation unmanned aircraft systems through 
qualitative methods. Specific techniques include archival review, semi-structured 
interviews and participant observation. We also leverage results to specify corresponding 
computational models for extended experimentation in the TASP domain. This involves 
two primary tasks: 1) investigate the technology trajectories and design visions for next 
generation unmanned aircraft systems; and 2) understand how to represent such 
 6 
trajectories and visions in terms of agent-based computational models. To scope the 
project appropriately, we concentrate on Task 1 in this investigation. 
In the balance of this technical report, we first provide an overview of the POWer 
computational experimentation environment and summarize results from our experiments 
on TASP C2 organizations and phenomena, for these constitute key background for the 
current study. Then we summarize the research method. Key results follow, and we 






A. POWER COMPUTATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
This section draws heavily from Gateau and colleagues (2007) to provide an 
overview of the POWer computational environment. POWer builds upon the planned 
accumulation of collaborative research over roughly two decades to develop rich, theory-
based models of organization processes (Levitt, 2004). Using an agent-based 
representation (Cohen, 1992; Kunz et al., 1999), micro-level organization behaviors have 
been researched and formalized to reflect well-accepted organization theory (Levitt et al., 
1999). Extensive empirical validation projects (e.g., Christiansen, 1993; Thomsen, 1998) 
have demonstrated the representational fidelity and shown how the qualitative and 
quantitative behaviors of our computational models correspond closely with a diversity of 
enterprise processes in practice. 
This research stream continues today with the goal of developing new micro-
organization theory and embedding it in software tools that can be used to design 
organizations in the same way that engineers design bridges, semiconductors or 
airplanes—through computational modeling, analysis and evaluation of multiple virtual 
prototypes. Such virtual prototypes also enable us to take great strides beyond relying 
upon the kinds of informal and ambiguous, natural-language descriptions that comprise 
the bulk of organization theory and C2 doctrine today. 
For instance, in addition to providing textual description, organization theory is 
imbued with a rich, time-tested collection of micro-theories that lend themselves to 
computational representation and analysis. Examples include Galbraith's (1977) 
information processing abstraction, March and Simon’s (1958) bounded rationality 
assumption, and Thompson’s (1967) task interdependence contingencies. Drawing on 
such micro-theory, we employ symbolic (i.e., non-numeric) representation and reasoning 
techniques from established research on artificial intelligence to develop computational 
models of theoretical phenomena. Once formalized through a computational model, the 
symbolic representation is “executable,” meaning it can be used to emulate organization 
dynamics. 
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Even though the representation has qualitative elements (e.g., lacking the 
precision offered by numerical models), through commitment to computational modeling, 
it becomes semi-formal (e.g., most people viewing the model can agree on what it 
describes), reliable (e.g., the same sets of organization conditions and environmental 
factors generate the same sets of behaviors) and explicit (e.g., much ambiguity inherent in 
natural language is obviated). This, particularly when used in conjunction with the 
descriptive natural language theory of our extant literature, represents a substantial 
advance in the field of organization analysis and design, and it offers direct application to 
research and practice associated with C2. 
Additionally, when modeling aggregations of people—such as work groups, 
departments or firms—one can augment the kind of symbolic model from above with 
certain aspects of numerical representation. For instance, the distribution of skill levels in 
an organization can be approximated—in aggregate—by a Bell Curve; the probability of 
a given task incurring exceptions and requiring rework can be specified—organization 
wide—by a distribution; and the irregular attention of a worker to any particular activity 
or event (e.g., new work task or communication) can be modeled—stochastically—to 
approximate collective behavior. As another instance, specific organization behaviors can 
be simulated hundreds of times—such as through Monte Carlo techniques—to gain 
insight into which results are common and expected versus rare and exceptional. 
Of course, applying numerical simulation techniques to organizations is hardly 
new (Law and Kelton, 1991), but this approach enables us to integrate the kinds of 
dynamic, qualitative behaviors emulated by symbolic models with quantitative metrics 
generated through discrete-event simulation. It is through such integration of qualitative 
and quantitative models—bolstered by reliance upon sound theory and empirical 
validation—that our approach diverges most from extant research methods and offers 
new insight into organization and C2 dynamics. 
We summarize the key POWer elements via Table 1 for reference. Most of these 
elements are discussed below, but this table provides a concise summary. The interested 









Abstract representations of any work that consumes time, is required for project completion and can 
generate exceptions.
Actors A person or a group of persons who perform work and process information. 
Exceptions
Simulated situations where an actor needs additional information, requires a decision from a 
supervisor, or discovers an error that needs correcting.
Milestones
Points in a project where major business objectives are accomplished, but such markers neither 
represent tasks nor entail effort.
Successor links
Define an order in which tasks and milestones occur in a model, but they do not constrain these events 
to occur in a strict sequence. Tasks can also occur in parallel. POWer offers three types of successor 
links: finish-start, start-start and finish-finish.
Rework 
links
Similar to successor links because they connect one task (called the driver  task) with another (called 
the dependent  task). However, rework links also indicate that the dependent task depends on the 
success of the driver task, and that the project's success is also in some way dependent on this. If the 
driver fails, some rework time is added to all dependent tasks linked to the driver task by rework links. 
The volume of rework is then associated with the project error probability settings.
Task 
assignments
Show which actors are responsible for completing direct and indirect work resulting from a task.
Supervision 
links
Show which actors supervise which subordinates. In POWer, the supervision structure (also called the 
exception-handling hierarchy) represents a hierarchy of positions, defining who a subordinate would 
go to for information or to report an exception.
 
 
POWer has been developed directly from Galbraith’s information processing 
view of organizations. This view of organizations, described in detail by Jin and Levitt 
(1996), has three key implications. 
The first is ontological: we model knowledge work through interactions of tasks 
to be performed; actors communicating with one another and performing tasks; and an 
organization structure that defines actors’ roles and constrains their behaviors. Figure 1 
illustrates this view of tasks, actors and organization structure. As suggested by the 
figure, we model the organization structure as a network of reporting relations, which can 
capture micro-behaviors such as managerial attention, span of control and empowerment. 
We represent the task structure as a separate network of activities, which can capture 
organization attributes such as expected duration, complexity and required skills. Within 
the organization structure, we further model various roles (e.g., marketing analyst, design 
engineer, manager), which can capture organization attributes such as skills possessed, 
 10 
levels of experience and task familiarity. Within the task structure, we further model 
various sequencing constraints, interdependencies and quality/rework loops, which can 




Figure 1 Information Processing View of Knowledge Work 
 
 
As suggested by the figure also, each actor within the intertwined organization 
and task structures has a queue of information tasks to be performed (e.g., assigned work 
activities, messages from other actors, meetings to attend) and a queue of information 
outputs (e.g., completed work products, communications to other actors, requests for 
assistance). Each actor processes such tasks according to how well the actor’s skill set 
matches those required for a given activity, the relative priority of the task, the actor’s 
work backlog (i.e., queue length), and how many interruptions divert the actor’s attention 
from the task at hand. 
The second implication is computational: work volume is modeled in terms of 
both direct work (e.g., planning, design, manufacturing) and indirect work (e.g., decision 
wait time, rework, coordination work). Measuring indirect work enables the quantitative 
assessment of (virtual) process performance (e.g., through schedule growth, cost growth, 
quality). 
The third implication is validational: the computational modeling environment 
has been validated extensively, over a period spanning more than two decades, by a team 
of over 30 researchers (Levitt 2004). This validation process has involved three primary 
Communications






streams of effort: 1) internal validation against micro-social science research findings and 
against observed micro-behaviors in real-world organizations, 2) external validation 
against the predictions of macro-theory and against the observed macro-experience of 
real-world organizations, and 3) model cross-docking experiments against the predictions 
of other computational models with the same input data sets (Levitt et al., 2005). As such, 
ours is one of the few, implemented, computational organization modeling environments 
that has been subjected to such a thorough, multi-method trajectory of validation. 
 
B. POWER MODEL EXAMPLE 
To help set up an example from our previous research project, here we summarize 
the experiment design, which centers on the two key dimensions: Autonomy and 
Interdependence. Briefly as outlined above, on the autonomy dimension we account for 
the technologic sophistication of the UAVs (Degree 0 – 5); on the interdependence 
dimension we account for the interdependence between multiple aircraft in concurrent 
operation (pooled, sequential, reciprocal, integrated), including both manned-only, 
unmanned-only and integrated manned-unmanned missions. With these two dimensions, 
we consider—in a systematic and orderly manner—a 6x4 matrix of increasingly complex 
TASP C2 contexts, which comprise collectively our set of experiment conditions.  
We summarize this context matrix in Table 2. At the one extreme, we consider 
two manned aircraft that are deployed in separate geographical regions of controlled 
airspace (e.g., within the vicinity of its host ship) or in the same geographical region but 
at different times. This corresponds to Degree 0 autonomy with pooled interdependence 
(i.e., labeled “D0P” in the table). At the other extreme, we consider a squadron of 
completely autonomous UAVs and a squadron of manned aircraft flying integrated 
missions in uncontrolled airspace. This corresponds to a group of Degree 5 UAVs 
reflecting both reciprocal interdependence among themselves and integrated 
interdependence with their manned aircraft counterparts (i.e., labeled “D5I” in the table). 
Each of the key intermediate conditions (i.e., Degree 0 to Degree 5 autonomy, across all 
four interdependence conditions) is examined systematically also for completeness. This 
matrix summarizes our computational experiment design. 
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Table 2 TASP C2 Computational Experiment Design Summary 
Degree\Interdependence Pooled Sequential Reciprocal Integrated 
Degree 0 D0P D0S D0R D0I 
Degree 1 D1P D1S D1R D1I 
Degree 2 D2P D2S D2R D2I 
Degree 3 D3P D3S D3R D3I 
Degree 4 D4P D4S D4R D4I 
Degree 5 D5P D5S D5R D5I 
 
 
Each of these 24 experiment design cells is represented by a separate 
computational model, which is simulated 50 times, across eight performance dimensions 
(i.e., duration, rework, coordination, wait, work cost, functional risk, mission risk and 
maximum backlog), to create a substantial analytic space. In this previous study, we 
examine each of these 24 test cases in terms of extant C2 organizations and approaches. 
In follow-on work, we plan to examine each of these cases in terms of the best C2 
organizations and approaches. 
Figure 2 delineates a screenshot of our baseline CTG organization and platform 
set. The light (green) person icons represent organizations at four levels (i.e., CTF, CTG, 
Platform [e.g., DDG, LCS], Aircraft Operators [e.g., F/A-18, MH-60]). The dark (brown) 
rectangle icons represent operational leadership, decision making and staff work in 
addition to common tasks (e.g., planning, maintenance, air traffic control), whereas the 
light (yellow) rectangle icons represent the aircraft ISR mission tasks; each aircraft must 
take off, navigate to its area of interest, operate in ISR mode, and then return to the ship 
for landing or recovery. Organizations and tasks are represented at appropriate levels: 
sufficiently low to capture the important structural and behavioral dynamics, but 





Figure 2 Baseline Model (D0P) – CVN F/A-18s 
 
 
At the lowest level in the organization lies an array of diverse manned 
(light/green) and unmanned (dark/blue) aircraft. F/A-18s (Degree 0) are assigned to the 
CVN. MH-60s (Degree 0) are assigned to one or more DDGs and LCSs as well as the 
CVN. ScanEagles (Degree 1) are assigned to the DDGs, and Fire Scouts (Degree 2) are 
assigned to the LCSs. Tritons (Degree 3) are examined as an asset from beyond the CTG 
itself (e.g., controlled by the CTF), and we examine two future AS (Degree 4 & 5 UAVs) 
principally in terms of CVN assignment here2. The many lines linking various icons in 
the figure are used to symbolize organization hierarchy, job assignment, task precedence, 
communication and other important model relations. For instance, the (dark/red) links 
connecting the Operate and Navigate tasks denote rework; if the Operate task fails to 
produce satisfactory ISR results (e.g., a promising contact is not located, insufficient 
intelligence is gathered, sensor data cannot be relayed), then the aircraft may have to 
                                                 
2 Understanding that the corresponding Degree 4 and 5 technology has yet to be fielded and developed, 
respectively, these UAVs could be either fixed or rotary wing (or both), and hence could potentially operate 
effectively from the CVN and other ship platforms (esp. DDG, LCS). 
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Navigate to some other region and Operate there. The interested reader can refer to 
Gateau et al. (2007) for detailed explanations for all key model links and parameters. 
In the baseline screenshot above, two (manned) F/A-18s are assigned to fly ISR 
missions in separate airspaces (i.e., D0P: Degree 0 autonomy, pooled interdependence). 
This task assignment is evident from the five (dark/blue) links between each F/A-18 actor 
and the aircraft ISR mission tasks (e.g., Take Off, Navigate, Operate); the first actor 
(labeled “F18-1” in the figure) is assigned to the upper sequence of tasks (e.g., labeled 
“Take Off 1,” “Navigate 1,” “Operate 1”), and the second actor (labeled “F18-2” in the 
figure) is assigned to the lower sequence of tasks (e.g., labeled “Take Off 2,” “Navigate 
2,” “Operate 2”). Here both (manned) aircraft are assigned to the same (CVN) platform 
and (CVW) organization, and each flies in a different region of airspace (pooled 
interdependence). This represents a very common and relatively straightforward C2 
context. 
As noted above, the simulated ISR mission has a planned duration3 set at 24 
hours. For aircraft such as the F/A-18s depicted in this model, such nominal 24 hour 
duration exceeds the endurance of a single aircraft sortie, so a sequence of sorties must be 
planned to span the whole 24 hour period, and sorties may have to continue beyond 24 
hours in order to accomplish all mission objectives. We take into account each aircraft’s 
performance characteristics (esp. endurance) when specifying the computational model, 
and we record each aircraft’s simulated performance level (e.g., actual mission duration) 
in the computational experiment.  
The other experiment conditions are specified and modeled similarly. In total we 
develop, specify, execute and analyze more than 36 different TASP C2 models to cover 
the 24 experiment conditions. Table 3 summarizes this model set. The first column lists 
each of the six autonomy degrees (e.g., “D0” = Degree 0; “D5” = Degree 5), and the 
second column designates which ship platforms4 the ISR aircraft operate from (e.g., 
“CVN” = carrier, “DDG” = destroyer, “LCS” = littoral combat ship, “LCDD” = littoral 
                                                 
3 Not all missions are equally effective, however, so some may take less than 24 hours to accomplish all 
ISR objectives successfully, whereas other may require (much) more time to complete. 
4 The Triton is land-based, and we presume that it comes under CTF control, hence the “CTF” designation. 
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combat ship + destroyer5). The third column designates which two aircraft types conduct 
each ISR mission (e.g., “1818” = two F/A-18s, “6060” = two MH-60s, “60SE” = one 
MH-60 and one ScanEagle).  
The remaining three columns are marked (x) to indicate where computational 
models have been developed. In all models where two aircraft of the same autonomy 
degree conduct a mission (e.g., two F/A-18s, two MH-60s, two ScanEagles), we examine 
all three interdependence levels (i.e., pooled, reciprocal, integrated6), but where a 
combination of manned and unmanned aircraft conduct a mission together (e.g., one MH-
60 and one ScanEagle or Fire Scout, one F/A-18 and one Triton, one MH-60 or F/A-18 
and one Level 4 or 5 UAV7), by definition only the integrated interdependence level 
applies, and hence only a single model is developed. 
 
                                                 
5 Where two different ship platforms are involved, we use only two letters for each, and we begin with the 
ship associated with the Leader aircraft. For instance, “LCDD” signifies that the Leader aircraft flies from 
an LCS and that the Wingman aircraft flies from a destroyer, whereas “DDLC” indicates that the Leader 
aircraft flies from a destroyer and that the Wingman aircraft flies from an LCS. 
6 Speaking technically, integrated interdependence does not apply to missions flown solely by two manned 
or two unmanned aircraft; that is, integrated interdependence applies only to missions flown by both 
manned and unmanned aircraft. Nonetheless, several model parameter settings differ between reciprocal 
and integrated interdependence experiment conditions, and it is informative to examine even all-manned or 
all-unmanned aircraft missions through both such conditions. 
7 An implicit assumption is that the Level 4 UAV will be rotary wing helo, and hence tend to fly with the 
MH-60, and that the Level 5 UAV will be fixed wing jet, and hence tend to fly with the F/A-18. 
Nonetheless, for C2 purposes, we also examine some different combinations (e.g., Level 4 or 5 could be a 
vertical take-off and landing jet). 
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Table 3 Summary of TASP C2 Models 
Model Summary
Level Ship Aircraft Pool Recip Integ
D0 CVN 1818 x x x
CVN 6060 x x x
DDG 6060 x x x
LCS 6060 x x x
D1 DDG SESE x x x
DDG 60SE x
LCDD 60SE x
D2 LCS FSFS x x x
LCS 60FS x
DDLC 60FS x
D3 CTF TRTR x x x
CVCT 18TR x
D4 CVN L4L4 x x x
CVN 60L4 x
DDCV 60L4 x
D5 CVN L5L5 x x x
CVN 18L5 x
CVDD 18L5 x  
 
 
C. KEY RESULTS 
Here we summarize key results of our C2 computational experimentation, which 
we organize in three parts: 1) Autonomy Degree, 2) Interdependence Level, and 3) C2 
Implications.  
1. Autonomy Degree 
Regarding autonomy degree, we can generalize to say that none of our 
performance measures varies linearly with increasing autonomy. Nonetheless, autonomy 
degree is a very impactful variable, and we find major C2 performance differences across 
the various manned and unmanned aircraft types, particularly in terms of the measures 
duration, functional risk and work cost. Specifically, the UAVs in our current inventory 
(Autonomy 1 – 3) take considerably longer to complete the ISR mission than either the 
manned (Autonomy 0) or future unmanned (Autonomy 4 & 5) aircraft. These same, 
current inventory UAVs also present greater functional risk. Both of these results stem 
from the lesser skill and experience levels associated with the corresponding UAV 
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aircrews, with an accumulation of mistakes and required rework affecting mission 
duration and functional risk levels directly. This affects C2 substantially, as longer 
durations and greater functional risk levels must be accommodated explicitly through 
mission planning, execution, monitoring and intervention activities. 
Work cost results affect C2 substantially also, as different aircraft can incur 
dramatically different operating costs for performing the same, nominal 24 hour ISR 
mission. Succinctly, the F/A-18 appears to represent the most costly ISR platform, yet it 
also exhibits the greatest speed and mission flexibility (e.g., strike). The MH-60 costs 
roughly half as much to operate, is comparable to the Fire Scout in that regard, and has 
distinct capabilities (e.g., rescue operations). The Triton costs in turn about half as much 
as the Fire Scout, and the ScanEagle—along with the Level 4 & 5 UAVs—is expected to 
cost even much less to operate. All other considerations aside, the operating cost of an 
ISR mission could become an important C2 consideration.  
2. Interdependence Level 
Regarding interdependence level, we isolate and examine interdependence effects, 
which are relatively clear: greater levels of interdependence correspond to higher values 
(but not necessarily “better” or “worse”) across almost all performance measures. This is 
clearly understandable in our TASP C2 context, for interactions between aircraft increase 
in frequency and intensity, and having multiple aircraft operating together in common 
airspace complicates their planning, operating, tracking, monitoring and intervening. 
For instance, we find that missions take longer to complete with increasing 
interdependence levels. This is evident in particular with the transition from reciprocal to 
integrated interdependence. As another instance, we see clearly an even more extreme 
effect in terms of coordination. Coordinating multiple aircraft flying in common airspace 
has a major impact in terms of C2. A third instance centers on mission risk, which nearly 
doubles as we transition from reciprocal to integrated interdependence. C2 for integrated 
interdependence appears to have critical issues.  
3. C2 Implications 
Regarding C2 implications, we begin by summarizing findings pertaining to 
current aircraft in operational use today: there is little cause for concern regarding 
Autonomy 0 (e.g., F/A-18, MH-60) with pooled interdependence (e.g., operating in 
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separate airspaces). This is something that the Navy knows how to do well. There are no 
C2 implications per se here. This is business as usual. 
Nonetheless, even though C2 appears to function acceptably well at present, 
several aspects of the extant and ubiquitous, military C2 organization and approach 
suggest that problems will emerge with continued advances in and integration of AS 
technology. For instance, the C2 organization reflects a tall, functional hierarchy, with 
considerable centralization, substantial formalization and frequent staff rotation. This 
makes for relatively long information flows and decision chains, coupled with perennial 
battles against knowledge loss from personnel turnover and challenges with cross-
functional (and even more so with joint and coalition) interaction.  
As another instance, the formalization inherent within this C2 organization 
reflects a strong dependence upon written standards, rules and procedures, but the pace at 
which UAVs and other AS are being introduced and integrated appears to be 
accelerating, and such formalization through written documents may have a hard time 
keeping up with rapid and local changes onboard various ships and among diverse 
aircrews. Many organization experts would argue that both instances militate against 
efficient—or even effective—C2. 
Indeed, these study results imply—somewhat counter intuitively—that unmanned 
(ISR) missions require more planning, monitoring, intervening and like control activities 
than their manned counterparts. Given our current C2 organization and approach, greater 
numbers of C2 staff—or more skilled and experienced staff members—will be required 
for unmanned than for manned missions, and such missions will take more time, suffer 
from more mistakes, and generally tax the C2 organization more. Although the 
capabilities of future UAVs may mitigate these effects to some extent, we must continue 
to address and endure the higher C2 load for now, and we should consider redesigning 
our familiar, military C2 organization to address the imminent shortcomings noted above. 
Further, required C2 skills and experiences may not be uniform across manned 
and unmanned missions. Indeed, we may find one set of C2 personnel (e.g., planners, 
controllers, watch standers) that is proficient principally in terms of manned missions, 
whereas a different cadre of personnel becomes proficient principally in terms of 
unmanned missions. Given our current C2 organization and approach, this will limit the 
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degree of flexibility available in terms of assigning suitably experienced personnel to 
different jobs, and many organizations will need to staff themselves with seemingly 
redundant personnel: some possessing skill and experience with manned operations and 
others possessing similar yet distinct skill and experience with their unmanned 
counterparts. Results reveal that as task interdependence continues its shift toward 
integrated manned-unmanned missions, such similar yet distinct skill and experience will 
likely break down and become ineffective for C2. Alternatively, as noted below, other 
approaches to organizing and conducting C2 offer potential to mitigate these detrimental 
effects. 
Results reveal further that C2 organizations will make more mistakes; experience 
increasing time pressure; require greater effort, more time and higher cost to conduct 
missions; and operate under conditions of substantially higher mission risk. Moreover, if 
our C2 organization and approach appear fragile with aircraft operating reciprocally (or 
integrally) only in pairs today, then one can easily imagine how such organization and 
approach could break under the load of tens or even hundreds (or possibly thousands) of 
aircraft operating simultaneously and reciprocally (or integrally). Imagine further the 
exacerbation stemming from a shift to strike and other missions that diverge from the ISR 
context of this study.  
Organizations will need to learn how to learn more quickly, and the current 
approach to education and training will likely fail. Other, more advanced approaches to 
accelerating knowledge flows through C2 organizations will likely become mandatory—
so that people, teams and organizations can learn more quickly and with fewer 
mistakes—and people will need ways to learn just in time (JIT), knowing what to do and 
how to do it well in the local context (e.g., when and where such awareness is needed). 
Our extant military C2 organization and approach appear to be unprepared to meet these 
organization learning demands. 
We understand increasingly well how C2 should focus on four, fundamental and 
inextricable elements: people, process, organization and technology. Our current C2 
organization and approach operate well across many conditions and circumstances at 
present, but teams of autonomous systems and people—especially as manifested through 
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integrated manned-unmanned aircraft missions—appear to fall way beyond this set of 
current conditions and circumstances. 
We do not have all of the answers in the previous study, but C2 organization 
(re)design lies at the center—particularly to promote rapid organization learning and to 
accelerate knowledge flows—and we may experience the compelling need to shift away 
from our familiar, hierarchical, archetypical C2 organization and toward higher maturity, 
agile, edge-like archetypes (e.g., Collaborative; see Alberts & Nissen, 2009).  
Moreover, this elucidates an organization challenge for TASP C2 in general and 
the CTG in particular: mission efficacy may require shifting from one C2 approach and 
organization to another depending upon the context; that is, the same CTG (or other C2 
organization) may need to employ different C2 approaches and organizations across the 
range of diverse TASP contexts, even within the same ISR mission set. Some nominal 
mission (e.g., “Mission-1”) may be approached best by the traditional hierarchy, for 
instance, but then the next nominal mission (e.g., “Mission-2”) may require Self-
Synchronization or other, different C2 organization and approach. This will require not 
only understanding which C2 organization and approach is most appropriate for each 
particular mission, but also knowing how to transition from one C2 organization and 
approach to another. As such we’re defining the state of the art with our research, and 
such C2 organization selection and transition is way beyond current practice. 
We need to understand more about future AS, and we need to examine current 
and future, manned and unmanned, aircraft missions through alternate C2 organizations 
and approaches (e.g., Hierarchy, Collaborative, Self-Synchronization). This represents 
the research trajectory on which this present study falls, as we examine future capabilities 




III. RESEARCH METHOD 
A. METHOD SUMMARY 
As noted above, we investigate technology trajectories and design visions for next 
generation unmanned aircraft systems through qualitative methods. Specific techniques 
include archival review, semi-structured interviews and participant observation. In terms 
of archival review, we focus on the current literature regarding the development of UAS 
with embedded artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities. Our experience in this field has led 
us to target a variety of sources, which serve to inform the study well and guide our 
qualitative investigation. 
Semi-structured interviews target systems design engineers and organizations who 
are leading the efforts in this field. Our experience in this field has led us to focus on 
several organizations that are advancing the state of the art regarding UAS. We identify 
the key people within each organization and arrange to conduct both semiformal and 
informal interviews with each of them. Because many aspects of advanced UAS 
technology are classified, interviews are not transcribed, but we take thorough notes, and 
we summarize our thoughts rigorously following each interview session. Our interview 
frame is summarized in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 Interview Frame 
Role Organization 
Associate Research Professor Carnegie Mellon University 
Director, CyLab Mobility Research 
Center 
Carnegie Mellon University 
Senior Research Engineer Stanford University 
Distinguished Engineer IBM Watson Group 
Director, Government Solutions IBM Watson Group 
Director, Waterloo Autonomous Vehicles 
Laboratory (WAVELab) 
University of Waterloo 
Interoperability Systems Engineer OSD 
Director, Mobile Robot Laboratory Georgia Institute of Technology 
Systems Engineer Naval Air Warfare Center 
Systems Engineer Naval Air Systems Command 




Participant observation involves participation in numerous autonomous systems 
conferences. We’re able to attend information sessions; converse with speakers, panelists 
and other attendees; and leverage such opportunities to identify additional sources of 
literature to review and to arrange additional interviews. Our conference frame is 
summarized in Table 5. For reference, conference organizers include Technology 
Training Corporation (TTC), Association of Unmanned Vehicles Systems International 
(AUVSI), US Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), New Mexico State University 
(NMSU), US Navy Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT). 
 
Table 5 Conference Frame 
Organization Conference 
TTC Unmanned Aircraft Systems  
TTC Unmanned Aircraft Systems Payloads 
TTC Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
AUVSI unmanned systems Program Review 
AUVSI unmanned systems North America 
OSD/NMSU Tactical Analysis and Assessment Center 
PACFLT Autonomous Off-board unmanned systems Workshop 
AAAI Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence 
MIT San Diego Executive Forum 
 
Qualitative data are collected, coded and analyzed continuously, with the data 
collection effort not stopping until theoretical saturation is reached. Coding adheres to 
well-accepted grounded theory building techniques (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & 







A. RESULTS OVERVIEW 
In this section we present the key findings and results of our qualitative 
investigation. We organize this discussion into the six primary themes that emerge from 
our coding and analysis of qualitative data: 1) technology, 2) programmatics, 3) 
education and training, 4) culture, 5) operations, and 6) strategy. We integrate key 
quotations and examples where appropriate. 
 
B. TECHNOLOGY 
In this section we elaborate our analyses and insights pertaining to technology.  
From our readings, interviews and observations, it becomes apparent that the U.S. 
military’s investments in unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have proven invaluable for 
missions from intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to tactical strike. Most 
of the current systems, however, require constant control by a dedicated pilot and sensor 
operator as well as a large number of analysts, all via telemetry8. These requirements 
severely limit the scalability and cost-effectiveness of UAS operations and pose 
operational challenges in dynamic, long-distance engagements with highly mobile targets 
in contested electromagnetic environments. 
 When considering the role that emerging technology will play in our future Naval 
Forces, it is clear that “Unmanned” Vehicles have a large and growing impact. This is 
reinforced by the 2009 CNO Strategic Studies Group (SSG) report (Hogg, 2009). We are 
rapidly approaching the point where every naval vessel will employ one or more UxVs9, 
and their employment as organic assets to individual fielded warfighters will become the 
norm. The term unmanned is a misnomer at present, however. A more appropriate term 
would be uninhabited, because, although there is no human physically in or on the 
vehicle, people are an integral component of all unmanned systems. In fact, the number 
of humans required to operate and exploit the capabilities of these vehicles is a major 
area of concern. So the question is not if humans are part of the system, but what is their 
                                                 
8 Very few systems have the capability to dynamically modify their flight profiles based on rudimentary 
logic algorithms, however none of these systems are based purely upon Artificial Intelligence. 
9 The term UxV is often used to refer to all classes of unmanned vehicles (air, surface, underwater, ground). 
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role. This leads to the concept level of autonomous behavior, which we address through 
the study in terms of our dimension autonomy degree. 
We identify five major, complementary, interrelated drivers of increasing 
autonomy. These include artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, biologic design, 
computational hardware, and perception. For ease of organization and exposition, we 
address each in turn. 
1. Artificial Intelligence 
AI has been the focus of active research for many decades, but it appears to have 
made some major breakthroughs in the past few years. In artificial intelligence, the term 
autonomy implies bounded independent thought and action. As a fundamental principle, 
Simon’s Law of Bounded Rationality 11 (Simon, 1991) states that the actions of a 
program or robot are bounded by the information it has, the amount of time available for 
computation, and the limitations of its algorithms. Thus, the independence of an AS is 
fixed by the designers.  
AI refers to the common core of programming principles as “agency.” If it is 
necessary to identify that an algorithm is restricted to a particular type of agent, AI refers 
to a mobile robot as a “physically-situated agent” to distinguish it from a “software 
agent,” and “robot” is reserved for a system using the factory automation style of 
programming. (Defense Science Board, 2012)  
One example of a mature robotic technology is the TurtleBot (Clear Path 
Robotics, 2009). These are commercially available off-the-shelf products. They come 
with a suite of sensors including but not limited to a Kinect sensor, eye view, gyroscope, 
odometry sensors on its wheels, and it drives like a car. On top of the TurtleBot there is a 
laptop that contains and applies the planning, control and other algorithms. The TurtleBot 
can operate autonomously. For several instances, it uses its Kinect sensor to get depth 
information about the walls and surroundings; it senses where walls and other obstacles 
are located; it calculates its physical location on an internal map representation; and it 
moves, collision-free, on its own: the only guidance needed is an ultimate destination.  
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2. Machine Learning 
Machine learning can be viewed as a branch of AI with explicit emphasis on how 
AS acquire the knowledge needed for autonomous operation. Traditionally knowledge 
acquisition has been a long and laborious process, through which operators, analysts, 
engineers and programmers hand code the algorithms and enter ‘chunks’ of knowledge 
manually. This process becomes arduous for large or complex systems, and it remains 
infeasible in circumstances where subject matter experts (SMEs) are unwilling or unable 
to codify their knowledge in terms that can be processed by machines. 
An exciting alternate approach is to produce computational machines that can 
learn on their own, generally with supervision, for this offers potential to obviate the long 
and laborious knowledge acquisition process. Machine learning technologies may enable 
unmanned vehicles to learn from their surroundings and mistakes. This would enable us 
not only to skip the initial knowledge acquisition process required to set up an AS, but 
also to reduce the amount of required initial knowledge. In other words, when a system 
can learn on its own, the burden of providing its initial knowledge can decrease 
dramatically, and the ability of the system to adjust to its unique mission-environment 
context and adapt to change can accelerate exponentially and proceed without human 
interaction. 
As noted recently by Selby (2015), some robots can learn to recognize objects and 
patterns fairly well, but to interpret and be able to act on visual input is much more 
difficult. Nonetheless, researchers at the University of Maryland, funded by DARPA’s 
Mathematics of Sensing, Exploitation and Execution (MSEE) program, recently 
developed a system that enabled robots to process visual data from a series of “how to” 
cooking videos on YouTube. Based on what is shown on a video, robots are able to 
recognize, grab and manipulate the correct kitchen utensil or object and perform the 
demonstrated task with a high degree of accuracy—without human input or 
programming. 
“The MSEE program initially focused on sensing, which involves perception and 
understanding of what’s happening in a visual scene, not simply recognizing and 
identifying objects,” said Reza Ghanadan, program manager in DARPA’s Defense 
Sciences Offices (Selby, 2015). “We’ve now taken the next step to execution, where a 
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robot processes visual cues through a manipulation, action-grammar module and 
translates the cues into actions.” 
Another significant advance to come out of the DARPA research is the robots’ 
ability to accumulate and share knowledge with others. Current sensor systems typically 
view the world anew in each moment, without the ability to apply prior knowledge. “This 
system allows robots to continuously build on previous learning—such as types of 
objects and grasps associated with them—which could have a huge impact on teaching 
and training,” Ghanadan said (Selby, 2015). “Instead of the long and expensive process 
of programming code to teach robots to do tasks, this research opens the potential for 
robots to learn much faster, at much lower cost and, to the extent they are authorized to 
do so, share that knowledge with other robots. This learning-based approach is a 
significant step towards developing technologies that could have benefits in areas such as 
military repair and logistics.”  
In his article on MSEE, Dr. Reza Ghanadan (Ghanadan, 2011) also notes the 
following. 
The goal of the Mathematics of Sensing, Exploitation and Execution 
(MSEE) program is to explore and develop high-impact methods for scalable 
autonomous systems capable of understanding scenes and events for learning, 
planning, and execution of complex tasks. The program is exploring powerful 
mathematical frameworks for unified knowledge representation for shared 
perception, learning, reasoning, and action. One of the central concepts in MSEE 
is to exploit methods based on minimalist generative grammar, similar to human 
language, to represent and process visual scenes and actions. Data-driven methods 
for spatial, temporal, and causal parsing of information are being developed for 
semantic understanding of scenes and events in unstructured environments along 
with cognitive processing methods for exploitation and manipulations. The 
foundational premise of the program is that a comprehensive mathematical 
framework to describe an integrated SEE system would allow for detailed 
analysis of its potential performance and serve as a guide to prototype design. 
Methods will be demonstrated in use cases motivated by defense applications 
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such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and vision-guided 
robots to perform repairs. 
The MSEE program aims to address a growing difficulty: The amount of 
data collected by DoD sensor systems exceeds the ability of human analysts and 
current automated decision systems to extract actionable information. This data 
deluge is pervasive throughout the military and applies to single and multi-modal 
sensing platforms. Today, evaluation methods rely on feature detection and 
category classification using individual pipelines for different tasks due to the 
lack of an effective unified representation. Hence, under the current paradigm, the 
semantics derived from sensor outputs do not emerge until an analyst has 
assimilated the data. 
As a result of this dynamic, three challenges emerge: 
data's worth can only be evaluated after analysts have interpreted it, and 
with knowledge of how it will be used; 
prior knowledge, including that which may have accrued during previous 
processing, is not used during the production of sensor products; in other words, 
sensors process signals as if they were seeing the world anew at every instant; 
and, 
in the presence of multiple sensors, analysts must reconstruct a unified 
view out of sensor output products that were not, in general, designed for 
integration. 
A new approach to sensing is required to confront these shortcomings. An 
effective representation for recognizing objects, attributes and actions, and for 
parsing spatial-temporal relational information, would result in scalable platforms 
capable of autonomous learning, inference, reasoning, planning and execution of 
complex tasks. 
The goal of the Mathematics of Sensing, Exploitation and Execution 
(MSEE) program is to capture the economy and efficiency that would derive from 
an intrinsic, objective-driven unification of sensing and exploitation. The 
foundational premise of the program is that a comprehensive mathematical 
framework to describe an integrated SEE system exists. Such a theoretical 
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description would allow for detailed analysis of its potential performance, serve as 
an invaluable guide when constructing a prototype to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the approach, and enable quantitative determination of the 
effective utility of various sensors and sensing modalities. 
MSEE includes three planned phases. The goal of Phase I is to create the 
mathematical foundation for a representation-centric model. The goal of Phase II 
is to refine the representation constructed in an initial software system able to 
answer queries related to the content of sensor data from a single modality. The 
goal of Phase III is to develop a fully integrated, modular system that 
demonstrates quantitative and qualitative analyses of systems that integrate 
sensing/perception, exploitation, and execution, with multi-modal sensor data. … 
To date, performers on MSEE have pursued fundamental research into the nature 
of stochastic modeling and knowledge representation. These basic tools are being 
used to build prototype systems. Progress in these areas should greatly advance 
DoD's ability to build high-performance systems in a number of areas including 
ISR and supervised robust autonomous systems. 
 
3. Biologic Design 
U.S. intelligence experts are trying to reverse engineer the algorithms of the 
human brain by blending data science and neuro science in attempts to make rapid 
advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence (Keller, 2015). To the degree that 
natural language analytics can play a role, Watson10 might be useful. The key elements 
and functions of this advanced technology include natural language processing, 
hypothesis generation and evaluation, and dynamic learning. Sometimes it's used in 
conjunction with other analytics (such as real-time data analytics) to inform decisions 
(Codella, 2012).  
Current initiatives are focused on creating ever more capable, neurally derived 
machine learning algorithms, with an aim to improve the ability to perform complex 
information processing tasks such as one-shot learning, unsupervised clustering, and 
scene parsing with near-human proficiency. 
                                                 
10 Watson is a cognitive system designed and built by IBM. 
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IARPA (Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity) computer and 
information technology researchers are intrigued with the data processing abilities of the 
human brain, specifically its ability to separate and categorize signals robustly in the 
presence of significant noise and non-linear transformations, and then extrapolate and 
apply single examples to entire classes of stimuli (Keller, 2015). 
Air Force researchers seek to automate the collection and use of intelligence 
information gathered from many different platforms and correlated in several different 
ways, make better use of raw sensor data from existing multisource, multiplatform, real-
time collection systems, and automate intelligence information processing for 
assessment, cueing, electronic attack, and battle damage assessment (Keller, 2010). 
 Many say that today's state of the art algorithms are brittle and do not generalize 
well—at least nowhere near the level of the human brain. Today's leading machine 
learning algorithms and the human brain still differ significantly in the details of their 
operation. 
 Further, Johnson et al. (2004) describe the design, development and testing of a 
UAS with highly automated search capabilities. These capabilities allow the system to 
search a prescribed area, identify a specific building within that search area based on a 
small identifying sign located on one wall, and locate a potential opening into that 
specified building. Subsequent to selection of the search area, all functions are automated 
and do not require human operator assistance. The applications of these capabilities 
include reduction of operator workload and facilitation of guided-munition missions, 
conducted without the assistance or intervention of human operators. 
This work builds upon previous development of a research UAS and image 
processing algorithms, and it is the first publication of the method used for automated 
mission management (i.e., the automation of mission-level decisions). Of particular 
significance is the fact that this work was carried to the flight test phase and was tested 
under realistic conditions. This introduces all of the issues relating to real-time 
algorithms, dealing with noise/clutter/uncertainty, and logistics which are all so important 
to practical automated mission management. 
 Researchers anticipate achieving a quantum leap by creating machine learning 
algorithms that use neurally inspired architectures and mathematical abstractions of the 
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representations, transformations, and learning rules employed by the brain. Targeting 
neuroscience experiments that interrogate the operation of mesoscale cortical computing 
circuits, and taking advantage of emerging tools for high-resolution structural and 
functional brain mapping, offer excellent promise, which should facilitate iterative 
refinement of algorithms based on a combination of practical, theoretical and 
experimental outcomes. 
 
4. Computational Hardware 
Big firms like Amazon, DHL and Google are developing their own drone fleets 
for rapid delivery of consumer goods, fast food and pharmaceuticals. However, current 
FAA rules restrict drones to flying within visual range of human operators because of the 
risk of collision. Drones need an automatic “sense-and-avoid” capability before they will 
be allowed to make deliveries on their own. 
Computers and their integrated sensor suites must be capable of recognizing 
objects in a timely manner in order to provide sufficient warning to avoid collisions. The 
key may be to mimic how brains work; our brains are poor at number-crunching but can 
process complex sensory input faster than digital systems. 
As noted by David Hambring in his New Scientist magazine article (Hambring, 
2015), Bio Inspired Technologies of Boise, Idaho, is building a sense-and-avoid system 
using a memristor, which integrates a resistor with a memory into a single device. Like 
the synapse in a biological brain, the memristor changes when impulses pass through it. 
Crucially, it is able to remember the impulse after it has stopped. This capability forms 
the basis of a learning system that mimics neurons and the connections between them. A 
chip-sized neural system linked to the drone’s existing camera can be trained to recognize 
aircraft and other hazards at long range. Bio Inspired’s drone should be ready for its first 
flight in the very near future. 
The system can also recognize objects like clouds, birds, buildings and radio 
towers, and it uses visual cues to estimate how far away the objects are. “Objects like 
other aircraft can be catalogued in a vague sense, meaning ‘I see an aircraft’, or in an 
exact sense: ‘I see another drone’,” says Terry Gafron, CEO of Bio Inspired (Hambring, 
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2015). Equipped with this information, the drone plots a new flight path to avoid a 
potential hazard and updates the hazard’s position in real time as the threat moves. 
“Nature seems to use this approach very effectively,” says David Warne of 
Queensland University of Technology in Australia, who has worked with artificial neural 
networks that allow drones to recognize vegetation (Warne, 2014, page 5). Like others in 
this area, much of Bio Inspired’s research has been funded by the military, but it offers 
the potential to serve a much broader market. A robust sense-and-avoid capability will 
make it possible for fleets of small drones to crisscross cities delivering packages, for 
instance. Like a bird or insect, a neural-enabled drone could fly to the trickiest landing 
places, even balconies. 
In the industrial field, neural drones could patrol pipelines looking for leaks, or 
identify electrical faults on power lines. Closer to home, smart drones could clean 
windows, pick up litter, clear gutters, weed your garden, or send information to your car 
about which parking spaces are open. “It simply flies around town monitoring parking 
spaces,” says Gafron (Brown, 2015). Smart drones could even track animal populations, 
flying along livestock boundaries to track wolf populations, for example. “Not only could 
the system fly autonomously, but it could conceivably tell the difference between a deer 
and a wolf from the air,” Gafron says. 
Memristor-inspired drones are not the only approach. In 2014, a US organization, 
DARPA, (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) unveiled the TrueNorth neural 
chip developed in conjunction with IBM. This project is a simulation of a neural network 
using digital hardware with enough neurons to match agile flyers like bees. This article 
appeared in print under the headline “A drone that learns” 
5. Perception 
The popular term "drone," which conjures images of remote-controlled flying 
zombies, is becoming less and less descriptive of the latest UAS technology. New 
applications are requiring more autonomy and intelligence. "When people think about 
drones, they largely think of big military assets that are flying high in the sky where 
there's not a whole lot of anything to hit," says Nick Roy, director of the Robust Robotics 
Group at MIT's Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (Brown, 2015). 
"But there are a lot of applications for smaller scale UAS working closer to the ground 
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that require more autonomy, such as agricultural monitoring, package delivery, and 
situational awareness for first responders." 
Teaching UAVs and other robots to think for themselves is the central mission of 
the Robust Robotics Group. "We want UAVs to be able to operate in urban 
environments, to get useful things done, and interact with people," says Roy, who is also 
an associate professor of aeronautics and astronautics (Brown, 2015). "We want them to 
become as intelligent as they need to be for the task at hand." 
Roy has recently focused more on UAVs than terrestrial robots, although many of 
the principles and algorithms are similar. UAVs will require more autonomy to avoid 
collisions and crashes, as well as to understand what's happening around them. Some 
level of reliable autonomous operation will be essential if the FAA is to fully permit 
commercial applications in the United States. "It's not just about avoiding obstacles, but 
about understanding the environment and what's safe and unsafe," Roy says. "UAVs need 
to understand their own behavior in terms of reliability and performance, and also to 
understand how people want them to do things" (Brown, 2015). 
Indeed, Roy accepted a sabbatical position in 2012 at Google X to help launch 
Project Wing, a project with the goal of demonstrating the viability of product delivery 
using UAVs. Project Wing is a hybrid aircraft instead of the typical quadrotor designs 
that have recently dominated the academic research and the consumer UAV market. 
Although it does use four rotors, the rotors normally perform like airplane propellers. 
When the craft reaches its target to drop a package, it tilts upward so it can hover like a 
quadrotor. This "tail sitter" design is a revision of an old idea that has yet to be proven 
commercially feasible. "Hybrid vehicles like tail sitters, tilt rotors, tilt props, or vehicles 
with two propulsion systems, have been explored throughout the history of aviation," 
Roy says. "But enough things have changed to make them worth trying again. Our ability 
to manufacture small vehicles and put computation and modern control systems onboard 
means the things that once were hard are relatively easy now" (Brown, 2015). 
Compared to quadrotors, conventional fixed wing craft have obvious limitations, 
including the need for a runway and the requirement for minimum airspeed to remain 
airborne, Roy says. Yet, "fixed wing craft are a lot more efficient in flight and can stay up 
much, much longer," he adds (Brown, 2015).  
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Although Roy is focused more on software than hardware, he must keep abreast 
with all of the last technologies, especially sensors, which help shape the way the UAV 
thinks. Spurred on by the need to reduce weight and power consumption, for example, 
some UAV researchers are aiming to use lightweight, low-cost cameras for navigation, 
rather than requiring LIDAR equipment or 3-D cameras. "Passive cameras give you an 
understanding of the scene that I think will be important in the future," Roy says. "Pure 
vision-based navigation has yet to work reliably, but the field has progressed a lot. I'm 
excited about how we might use passive cameras to help UAVs navigate on their own" 
(Brown, 2015). 
In the meantime, no single sensor technology is the right answer, Roy says. "GPS 
has issues in urban environments and cameras have issues especially at night," he says. 
"A lot of my group's recent research has focused on accurate ranging, whether it's a laser 
range finder or a 3-D camera. Those sensors are heavy and don't work in every domain. 
The right answer will probably lie in a fusion of sensors" (Brown, 2015). 
Delivery UAVs like Project Wing or Amazon's prototype will need more 
autonomy and intelligence than a typical UAV used for crop monitoring or filming 
commercials. This is especially true if the UAV is expected to drop off and pick up 
packages in urban environments. "The UAV will need to be smart enough to reason about 
its own performance and impending failures," Roy says. "Autonomy is the biggest 
challenge facing integration in the airspace. Vehicles need autonomy in order to recover 
from failures, and to see other aircraft and not hit them. They need autonomy to interact 
with air traffic control and play nicely in the national airspace" (Brown, 2015). 
Researchers at MIT and elsewhere have focused on imbuing robots with object 
recognition, but that's only the beginning. A greater challenge is to bridge the gap 
between the fundamentally different ways in which people and robots think. 
"Robots think about the world in terms of very low level geometry," Roy says. "They 
don't think of walls as walls, but rather as pixels they can't drive through. To work with 
people, robots must understand what things are for. To ask a robot to collect a box or load 
a truck, it needs the semantic understanding of what these objects are" (Brown, 2015). 
Roy is focused less on object recognition itself than on helping robots "understand 
how objects are distributed and how they can interact with them," he says. "Once you 
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have object detection or scene understanding, you can move to the next step: showing the 
robot how to use this understanding to make decisions" (Brown, 2015). 
One of Roy's students, for example, is attempting to improve a UAV’s 
understanding of wind patterns in the urban environment. The UAV could then use that 
knowledge to avoid turbulence or choose minimal energy routes. Despite the continuing 
advance of computer miniaturization, the weight and power limitations of UAVs will 
continue to challenge their ability to process information quickly enough to make timely 
decisions. Rapidly fusing and integrating data from multiple sensors poses 
"computational challenges that are outside the scope of real-time systems like UAVs," 
Roy says. "A lot of my research involves finding useful approximations that involve 
getting very good answers at the cost of a little accuracy and precision" (Brown, 2015). 
These approximation algorithms were put to work in Roy's recent experiments in 
which a fixed wing vehicle carrying a laser range finder flew at nearly full speed around 
the tightly constrained environment of a parking garage. "If you were to try to incorporate 
the laser range finder into the full-state estimate of the vehicle's 12 degrees of freedom, 
the computation would get intractable," Roy says. "But if you break the problem apart 
into the bits that the laser finder can see at any one time, you can still get the right 
answer, but much more efficiently than if you ask the laser to 'reason develop' the entire 
system at once" (Brown, 2015). 
Teaching UAVs to recognize objects and process sensor data in order to make 
real-time decisions will help avoid collisions even in complex environments, including 
offices. Yet, additional autonomy and intelligence is required when UAVs work closely 
together with people. Beyond ensuring the safety of humans, the algorithms need to be 
sufficiently sophisticated to enable UAVs to take instructions from people or collaborate 
with them to get things done. 
 
C. PROGRAMMATICS 
In this section we elaborate our analyses and insights pertaining to 
programmatics. Despite compelling reasons to employ more autonomous functionality in 
AS, a variety of inter-related reasons contribute to a collective inability in terms of 
providing such capabilities. 
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For one, by their very nature, autonomous capabilities are enabled by software. 
The proportion of software costs to overall system costs continue to grow with the 
increasing complexity of the software itself. Additionally, a brief examination of the 
literature reveals numerous autonomous functions have been developed by many groups; 
yet little of this capability finds its way into operationally fielded systems. Examining 
commercial applications point to several approaches that may help address this issue.  
First and foremost, the DoD must recognize that it is no longer the biggest player 
in the unmanned systems field. Soon that organization will assume a similar role to where 
it is in computers. DoD may have initiated this technology, but now it is having a smaller 
impact. In a world where you can order a drone on Amazon for $200, and the largest 
manufacturer of drones is the China based DJI, the DoD has no choice but to adapt. 
When trying to determine when these autonomous capabilities will become 
pervasive, it is insightful to consider the automobile industry. Many people are awaiting 
the arrival of the driverless car (like the one Google is driving on California roads) and 
wondering when they will be able get autonomy in their cars. Meanwhile, several of the 
autonomous capabilities that will be standard in most driverless cars already exist in their 
cars today. These include ubiquitous technologies like GPS and ABS and recent 
developments such as lane change detection; driver alertness monitoring; front crash 
prevention systems; and automatic parallel parking systems.  
Autonomy seems unlikely to be developed in one big bang. Rather, it will more 
likely evolve from basic autonomous functional components. Although such components 
must be integrated into a system, they will be supplied from a variety of sources. For 
many types of components, the manufacturers are relatively stable and have well 
established ties to DoD. In the area of software that provides autonomous functionality, 
however, relatively few coincide with classic defense contractors, and the DoD may have 
to adjust to new suppliers more than vice versa. 
The typical model of defense acquisition appears ripe for change to accommodate 
autonomous systems, and open architecture (both technical and programmatic) appears to 
be key in this regard. For instance, open architecture enables users to rapidly integrate 
autonomous capability components on systems throughout their life cycle. The DoD 
Open Systems Architecture Contract Guidebook (DoD Data Rights Team, 2013) provides 
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insight and guidance, but programs with fielded systems will need to improve in terms of 
accountability, to evolve to modular open system architectures for autonomy, and to 
develop acquisition strategies that allow easier third party integration. This will likely 
require such programs to take more of a lead system integrator role.  
An example of a program attempting a more open approach is the Common 
Control System (CCS) for Naval UAS (NAVAIR News, 2011). Following product 
integration, which will ultimately optimize UAS interoperability and sensor functionality, 
the CCS will provide flexibility and allow efficient services and control, which is 
currently an immature technology. Another significant effort, initiated by NAVAIR, is 
the Future Airborne Capability Environment (FACE; see Adams, 2014). The FACE 
initiative, which is a combined US Army and Navy program, will ultimately standardize 
avionics software for UAS, slash acquisition costs, and reduce time to market. 
Another programmatic challenge is providing capability across the metaphoric 
“valley of death” between science and technology (S&T) research efforts and fielded 
systems. In addition to providing open architecture environments for the S&T 
community, overcoming this challenge will require programs to be held accountable for 
pulling in promising autonomous S&T capabilities as they emerge. For instance, a 
developer focused on autonomy could be required to conform to a modular design that 
aligns with current open architectures of fielded systems or systems under development.  
Integrating autonomous functional components from a variety of sources that are 
in continuous competition is just the first step. Typically, testing and certifying software 
is the most costly and time consuming aspect of the development. In the past, developers 
have attempted to exercise all possible logic branches during the test/certification phase, 
particularly for safety and/or security critical functions. However, as autonomous 
behaviors continue to mature, this approach is becoming unaffordable.  
Moreover, as AS developers continue integrating ever more non-deterministic 
functions (e.g., autonomous algorithms that learn and change behavior based on what 
they learn), it will become infeasible to test all possible outcomes. Instead, new designs, 
system analyses, cost-efficient testing and certification processes will all become 
necessary, as will tools to allow certification of such algorithms while maintaining safe 
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and secure operations. Designs will need to reflect architectures that facilitate appropriate 
segregation and robustness to be reliable, safe and secure.  
Indeed, algorithm and software certification processes may begin to look more 
like those used to certify people. As with people, they are given more responsibility with 
experience only as they demonstrate that they can perform important tasks in a reliable 
and appropriate manner. As with people also, for another instance, since they learn and 
change continually, algorithm and software certifications will need to be updated on an 
ongoing basis. This will necessitate tools for modeling and simulation, with fidelity 
spanning the range from basic to high, in addition to flight test platforms with open 
architectures that allow the routinely use of surrogate vehicles prior to integrated testing 
on an operational platform. 
 
D. EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
In this section we elaborate our analyses and insights pertaining to education and 
training. It is important to realize that the area of autonomy is highly dynamic. Change is 
fast and very difficult to anticipate. This highlights the importance of education and 
training in Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM), particularly as it 
focuses on robotics and autonomy. Competitions such as FIRST, VEX, and those 
sponsored by the AUVSI Foundation give young STEM students a level of excitement on 
par with sports teams. FIRST (For Inspiration and Recognition of Science and 
Technology) is an international youth organization that operates robotic competitions and 
fosters the development of STEM skill sets in today’s younger generations. VEX is an 
organization that sponsors world-wide robotics competitions primarily for middle school 
and high school students. The AUVSI (Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems 
International) Foundation, with significant financial support from the Office of Naval 
Research, sponsors UAV, USV and UUV (ROBOSUB) competitions primarily for US 
and international high school and college students.  
DoD labs could go further, for instance, by partnering with regional academic 
institutions that are working in these areas, and seek to enhance learning. STEM 
graduates are highly valued in the commercial world, and the DoD will likely face stiff 
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competition for such talent. A focus on education and training may indeed be as 
important as our current emphasis on technology. 
  
E. CULTURE 
In this section we elaborate our analyses and insights pertaining to culture. 
The cultural acceptance of autonomy is clearly one of the most challenging issues. We 
have identified concerns with trust and ethical issues associated with the employment of 
unmanned systems. Will people learn to trust machines to think and act for them? Can 
machines be taught to make ethical decisions? Such questions point away from 
technology—although they have technologic underpinnings—yet are as or more 
important than the technology itself. What benefit can one expect to derive from 
integrating manned and unmanned aircraft (e.g., in common squadrons, on common 
missions, through training exercises) if human pilots refuse to trust or even fly with their 
machine counterparts? The greatest autonomy technology in the world will fail to support 
TASP if people cannot accept and learn to leverage this robust capability. 
 "We need to teach robots how to interact with people as seamlessly as people 
work with each other," Roy says. "They need things like semantic maps to help them 
think about the world the same way people do. They also need to understand what people 
want and how they behave. We're looking at things like natural language interfaces, and 
connecting human speech with the things the robot sees" (Doshi, 2007). 
Toward this end, the Robust Robotics Group has made some progress in teaching 
robots to understand directions and instructions. Now, the group is working on dialog 
management: teaching the robot and human how to converse. "The challenge for the 
robot is not just how to know it needs to ask a question, but how to ask the question in a 
way that can return a useful answer," Dr. Nicholas Roy says. "If the robot says, 'I don't 
understand,' the human will probably get annoyed and abandon the robot. … This 
technology has to mature substantially before we're really ready to have robots become 
part of our everyday lives" (Doshi, 2007). 
We also find considerable fear and criticism regarding lethal autonomy (e.g., 
arming AS). Heather Roff, for instance, asks how too much autonomy could possibly 
impact public perception and once again offer an ethical dilemma (Roff, 2015), while 
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others fear that autonomous weapons could spark an arms race that would increase both 
the likelihood of wars and the slope of their escalation (Roff, 2015). We have also 
identified an open letter from the Future of Life Institute (with16,000 signatories, 
including Stephen Hawking, Steve Wozniak and Elon Musk), which calls for a ban on 
artificially intelligent weapons. Civilian politicians, who are elected by the voting public, 
sit atop every military organization in the US, so popular opinion matters. 
 
F. OPERATIONS 
In this section we elaborate our analyses and insights pertaining to operations. 
Autonomy is important for operations in many ways. One is to address the key 
vulnerabilities of AS. For instance, autonomous systems need to operate in a 
communication (including GPS) limited or denied environment. Bandwidth is limited 
even under the best of circumstances, and loss of all communications for a period of time 
is frequent. To cope with this limitation at present, a UAS will typically exhibit a return 
to base behavior, or it will initiate a lost communications mode, both of which are 
preprogrammed and enabled automatically.  
However, future systems will need to be more capable. One can’t rely on 100% 
communications when operating routinely in the National Air Space (NAS), for instance. 
According to the CNO SSG “If the Navy could overcome the communication and 
precision navigation limitations, there could be nearly a four-fold increase in the situation 
where unmanned systems could carry out the missions” (Hogg, 2009). Indeed, AS will be 
required to operate in a “network optional” manner. When a patrol of warfighters is sent 
on a mission, for instance, they will be most effective when they have communications 
that permit them to exploit intelligence from other sources; coordinate their actions with 
other units; and receive commands when required. However, they must also be capable of 
maintaining effectiveness even if this communication capability is lost or degraded. 
Another operational reason for autonomy centers on functions where computers 
can outperform people. For instance, it would be extremely difficult for a human pilot to 
remotely control an air vehicle and perform a consistent safe landing in the highly 
dynamic shipboard environment. Hence the US Navy has successfully demonstrated that 
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it can employ autonomous shipboard recovery algorithms for a variety of UASs including 
the MQ-8B, MQ-8C, X-47B, RQ-21A, and the Scan Eagle.  
Perhaps the most pressing operational need for autonomous functions, in our AS, 
is to address a problem that is associated with one of their primary strengths; that of 
persistence. At a mission radius of 2000 nm, the Triton (RQ-4) UAS (three vehicles), for 
instance, is designed to provide persistent ISR, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, at least 
80% of the time. The Triton employs a variety of sensors including a 360-degree Field of 
Regard (FOR) Multifunction Active Sensor (MFAS) electronically steered array radar, an 
Electro-Optical / Infrared (EO/IR) sensor, an Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
receiver, and Electronic Support Measures (ESM). The amount of raw data produced by 
this system is staggering. The bandwidth required to transmit this volume data is huge. 
Sophisticated autonomous algorithms, which would convert data into actionable 
intelligence onboard the aircraft, would simultaneously improve the effectiveness of the 
system; decrease its communication vulnerability, and reduce the number of humans 
required to deal with this large amount of data. Naval forces, whether sea based or a 
Marine Expeditionary Unit, do not have the capacity to add large numbers of personnel to 
operate and exploit AS. 
Another area where autonomous capabilities will prove invaluable is through 
evolution from the current paradigm of one or more “operators” per vehicle to a system 
of systems approach, in which a small number of people oversee multiple vehicles and 
sensors as mission managers, and in which the vehicles manage themselves. This would 
decrease the manning required for UAS operations, and with sufficient progress in terms 
of autonomy enable swarming behaviors, in which a large number of relatively 
inexpensive systems could autonomously collaborate to overwhelm an adversary. This 
concept was recently demonstrated by the ARSENL (Advanced Robotic Systems 
Engineering Laboratory) team at NPS, for instance, where 2 operators managed 50 small 
UAS.  
This mission manager concept would also permit exploitation of multi-domain AS 
in a manner that individual systems can’t effectively achieve. As a current example, 
consider the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) mission, for which the Navy is the lead 
service. Currently an EOD team must be deployed to the location of a suspected 
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Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or like hazard. The team is exposed to possible 
enemy fire while transiting to and from the IED site and while on site. The team typically 
employs an Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) in line of sight teleoperation mode.  
However, as a use case, consider if the system were to include a UAS (e.g. Fire 
Scout) in conjunction with the EOD UGV. The IED mission could potentially be 
managed without any EOD personnel at the suspected IED site. For instance, the UAV 
could carry the UGV to an area of interest, survey the area to determine the optimal 
placement of the UGV, and provide ideal tactical path information from the UGV to the 
IED location. It could also act as the communications relay between the UGV and the 
mission commander as well as provide overwatch surveillance of the mission area 
looking for possible ambushes and awareness of civilians potentially at risk. The mission 
could be managed seamlessly from a single control station, and tasks related to the 
vehicles could be managed by onboard autonomous software. The UAV could then 
retrieve the UGV upon rendering the IED site safe and ferry it back to base. The mission 
as such could be accomplished faster, more effectively, and without risk to personnel. 
 Another operational use case centers on whether an autonomous UAS (e.g., 
unmanned helicopter) might be more effective than people at making targeting decisions. 
In the heat of battle, for instance, a soldier may be tempted to return fire indiscriminately, 
in part to save his or her own life. By contrast, a machine (today) won't grow impatient or 
scared, be swayed by prejudice or hate, willfully ignore orders, or be motivated by an 
instinct for self-preservation. Indeed, many researchers argue for speedy deployment of 
self-driving cars on similar grounds. Vigilant electronics may save lives currently lost 
because of poor split-second decisions made by people. How many soldiers in the field 
might die waiting for the person exercising "meaningful human control" to approve an 
action that a computer could initiate instantly? 
 
G. STRATEGY 
In this section we elaborate our analyses and insights pertaining to strategy. 
Today, Pentagon officials are intensifying their quest for technologic superiority. It “is 
one of the most important strategic tasks and risks facing our Department,” Deputy 
Defense Secretary Bob Work said at the opening of the China Aerospace Studies Institute 
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(Work, 2015). “Because if we allow our technical superiority to erode too much, again, 
this will undermine our conventional deterrence. It will greatly raise the cost, the 
potential cost of any intervention overseas, and will contribute to crisis instability.” 
Deputy Work expands upon his vision of future autonomy in war. “You’ll have a 
high degree of human-machine collaboration, like free-style chess, in which machines, 
using big data analytics and advanced computing, will inform human decision makers on 
the battlefield to make better decisions than humans can do alone or machines can do 
alone,” he said (Work, 2015). “You’re going to have routine manned and unmanned 
teaming. You’re going to have increasingly capable autonomous unmanned systems. You 
are going to have all of this. So the future of combat, we believe is going to be 
characterized by a very high degree of human-machine symbiosis, such as crude 
platforms controlling swarms of unmanned, inexpensive unmanned systems that can be 
flexibly combined and fielded in greater numbers.” 
These types of systems, far beyond the cheap and immature ones of today, herald 
a qualitative shift in strategy. If the U.S. begins to wage war in this way—or even gains 
the ability to do so—then competitor nations will likely grow fearful and feel vulnerable. 
This is a strategic concern in two aspects regarding the kind of damage that can result 
from an arms race between nations. First, arms races—as interactive competitions 
between rival states, where the competitors build up particular weapons technologies, 
capabilities or personnel over time—increase not only the probability of militarized 
disputes between competitors, but also the probability of escalation when those disputes 
erupt. Arms races make war more likely and more violent.  
Second, the type of technology we are discussing here extends well beyond 
conventional weapons in conventional war. We are talking about creating weapons that 
push the boundaries of artificial intelligence and autonomy. This push to create adaptive, 
learning and intelligent weapons platforms will ultimately require greater onboard 
capabilities, less communication, and a system-of-systems approach to war. They will 
also effect delegated decision-making and accelerate the tempo of war. Quite central to 
the thrust of our research stream, this will challenge—and very quickly break—the 
current C2 structure. The greatest technologic accomplishments in terms of autonomous 
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systems are useless unless they can be commanded to do what is desired and controlled to 
avoid doing what is not desired. 
Moreover, the metaphoric price of entry into AS is relatively low. Most unlike the 
nuclear stockpiling that occurred during the Cold War, and quite different from large-
scale major weapon systems of today (think aircraft carriers, jets and tanks), autonomous 
systems are comparatively very inexpensive to acquire and straightforward to develop 
and deploy. One can purchase a credit-card sized Raspberry Pi computer for $30, for 
instance, and a $200 quad copter can be bought online. In this way, autonomy may 
accentuate asymmetric warfare, giving smaller, even non-state adversaries access to 
disruptive technologies. This is in parallel to the manner in which cyber attacks, IEDs and 
like, inexpensive capabilities are affecting the tactics and disrupting the operations of 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The technologic capabilities of autonomous systems (AS) continue to accelerate, 
and integrated performance by AS and people working together can be superior to that of 
either AS or people working alone. We refer to this increasingly important phenomenon 
as Teams of Autonomous Systems and People (TASP), and through our recent 
research—representing the current state of the art—we have demonstrated a 
computational experimentation capability in the TASP domain. The problem is, several 
technology trends suggest that unmanned aircraft may be diverging away from operating 
and behaving like their manned counterparts, suggesting that some of our most futuristic 
model assumptions may be off target.  
This is where our ongoing research project continues to make an important 
contribution. The project described in this technical report centers on expanding our 
recently enabled C2 computational modeling and simulation capability to understand the 
next generation of unmanned aircraft systems, with particular emphasis on specifying 
advanced models for computational experimentation and the potential influence of 
Artificial Intelligence. In particular, we investigate technology trajectories and design 
visions for next generation unmanned aircraft systems through qualitative methods.  
In this technical report, we provide an overview of the POWer computational 
experimentation environment and summarize results from our experiments on TASP C2 
organizations and phenomena, for these constitute key background areas of interest for 
the current study. Such results fall in three primary areas: 1) Autonomy Degree, 2) 
Interdependence Levels, and 3) C2 Implications. 
Then we summarize the qualitative research method. Specific techniques include 
archival review, semi-structured interviews and participant observations. Qualitative data 
are collected, coded and analyzed continuously, with the data collection effort not 
stopping until theoretical saturation is reached. Coding adheres to well-accepted 
grounded theory building techniques, including open, axial and selective coding activities 
in series. 
Key results follow, which we organize into the six primary themes that emerge 
from our coding and analysis of qualitative data: 1) technology, 2) programmatics, 3) 
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education and training, 4) culture, 5) operations, and 6) strategy. Within the technology 
theme, we identify five major, complementary, interrelated drivers of increasing 
autonomy. These include artificial intelligence, machine learning, biologic design, 
computational hardware, and perception. We cite a number of examples and challenges 
for each driver, and we explain how they affect autonomy today as well as projecting 
how they portend to continue doing so in the future.  
One major implication is that such complementary technologies combine to 
enable degrees of autonomy that far surpass systems in operation today. Another is that 
autonomous systems are becoming increasingly capable in their behavior, yet we find a 
diversity of technologic approaches to enabling such behavior. Traditional AI with its 
long and laborious knowledge acquisition process is giving way to machine learning 
techniques, and researchers are leveraging the human brain and biologic systems for 
technical insight, inspiration and architecture pertaining to autonomous thinking and 
learning. A third implication centers on computational hardware such as the memristor, 
which has biologic inspiration and enables new integrated capabilities, and the ever 
expanding requirement for UAS in particular to perceive their environments. 
Within the programmatics theme, we note several reasons why autonomous 
capabilities remain slow in terms of reaching the field for operations. Such reasons center 
on the software intensive nature of such capabilities and the challenges associated with 
software development and acquisition. We also note how numerous software developers 
in this area are not among the large DoD focused firms that build airplanes, ships and 
tanks; rather, many are comparatively very small firms, for which the DoD does not 
represent a major customer. Open systems architectures are very important too, and we 
note the challenges inherent in attempting to certify advanced autonomous systems, 
which cannot be tested exhaustively, particularly as they continue to learn and adapt after 
operational release and use. 
The education and training theme emerges as a very important one, in which we 
highlight the importance of science, technology, engineering and math (STEM), 
particularly as it focuses on robotics and autonomy. Indeed, a focus on education and 
training may be as or more important than our current emphasis on technology. 
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Likewise with the culture theme, for the cultural acceptance of autonomy is 
clearly one of the most challenging issues. We have identified concerns with trust and 
ethical issues associated with the employment of unmanned systems. Such concerns point 
away from technology—although they have technologic underpinnings—yet are as or 
more important than the technology itself. What benefit can one expect from integrating 
manned and unmanned aircraft (e.g., in common squadrons, on common missions, 
through training exercises), for instance, if human pilots refuse to trust or even fly with 
their machine counterparts? The greatest autonomy technology in the world will fail to 
support TASP if people cannot accept and learn to leverage it. Hence a very important 
research thrust emphasizes teaching autonomous systems how to interact with people as 
seamlessly as people work with each other. We also note how public fear of armed 
autonomous systems has the potential to undermine even heroic technologic progress 
through the democratic voting system and civilian leadership of military organizations in 
the US. 
Within the operations theme, we identify numerous operational needs for 
autonomy. Addressing current vulnerabilities in terms of interrupted communication 
represents one notable example, but leveraging the capabilities of computers that 
dominate human performance represents a critical example that undergirds TASP. 
Reducing the manning levels required to operate UAS is clearly important too, where the 
mission manager approach could enable AS swarming and like behaviors. 
Finally, the strategy theme provides an opportunity for us to summarize aspects of 
autonomy which are causing strategic disruption and need for change. Military leaders at 
the highest levels recognize the potential of AS in warfare and for deterrence alike, and 
the need for people and machines to work cooperatively together rises to the top of 
critical needs in this regard. We also note the potential for new arms races based on AS 
capabilities, and we emphasize the asymmetric nature of AS: the metaphoric price of 
entry into AS is relatively low. 
Here we conclude in turn with our agenda for continued research along these 
lines. Through the present investigation, we gain greater insight into and understanding of 
autonomy trends—not just technologic trends, but programmatic, educational, cultural, 
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operational and strategic—that inform our vision of TASP over the coming five to ten 
years.  
Instead of pragmatically assuming that the future will be as we have been 
envisioning it (esp. that unmanned systems will evolve to operate and behave 
increasingly like their manned counterparts), now we have several, rich, interrelated 
themes to help organize a definitively multifaceted future, and we can see some important 
aspects of TASP that we had not deemed previously to warrant inclusion in our models 
(e.g., programmatics, education and training, culture, strategy). We also now have a finer 
grained view of technologic advancements, which we can grasp more easily in terms of 
complementary, interrelated drivers such as AI, machine learning, biologic design, 
computational hardware and perception. 
The next step is to understand the implications of this new knowledge in terms of 
computational modeling and to refine our POWer models to support correspondingly 
finer grained and more knowledgeable computational experiments on TASP C2. 
Integrating and building upon results from our previous computational experiments will 
provide an excellent basis for progress in this regard, especially as we have a number of 
novel C2 organizations and approaches (e.g., Collaborative, Self-Synchronization) to 
assess. This represents the research trajectory on which this present study falls, and we 
welcome other researchers, leaders and policy makers to join our effort to develop good 
answers and to provide effective guidance. C2 represents the single, most important 
determinant of military efficacy (Nissen, 2013), and although we have been learning and 
mastering C2 over many millennia, we’re witnessing quantum change in terms of AS at 
present, and the military that masters the associated C2 most quickly may very well win 
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